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FEDERAL PROCEDURE

FEDERAL PROCEDURE
Public Contracts
The exact position in the federal judicial system of the
government's numerous contract appeals boards has long
been the subject of speculation and controversy.1 The

Supreme Court recently took a major step in defining that
position. In U.S. v. Carlo Bianchi and Company2 it was
held that a government contractor's appeal under the
Wunderlich Act from a federal agency's administrative
fact finding may not be heard de novo in a court of law.
It must be accepted as presented by the agency's appeals
board.
The plaintiff contracted in 1946 with the Army Engineers to build a 710-foot tunnel. The terms included the
standard "disputes" and "changed conditions" clauses.4
While the specifications called for temporary supports only
when necessary for the workers' safety, subsurface conditions encountered were so hazardous that the plaintiff felt
completion of the tunnel without permanent steel supports
would be impossible. The contracting officer refused any
extra compensation under the changed conditions clause for
I

See, generally, McBride and Wachtel, Government Contracts
§§ 6.10-6.250 (1963).
2 37.3 U.S. 709 (1963).
3 The government's consent to be sued in contract. 41 U.S.C.
§ 321-322. The Act provides that any department head's decision
made final by a government contract clause shall indeed be conclusive unless "fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or is not supported
by substantial evidence." However, such clauses may not be pleaded if fraud is alleged, and clauses making final an administrative
decision on questions of law are prohibited.
4 The "disputes" clause: ". . .all disputes concerning questions of
fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the contracting officer subject to written appeal. . .to the head of the department concerned, or his duly authorized representative, [i.e.,
contract appeals board] whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto. In the meantime the contractor
shall diligently proceed with the work as directed."
A board decision which is "arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or
not supported by substantial evidence" is subject to "reversal"
by the courts. For any claim, a board hearing is a conditionprecedent to litigation, since relief may be granted by the board.
The "changed conditions" clause authorizes the contracting officer
to provide an equitable adjustment for the arising of conditions
materially different from those contemplated by the contract
originally.
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the expenditure. Contractor appealed to the Engineers Appeals Board, and continued meanwhile as required, completing the work with permanent supports. (1948).
The Board considered, in its decision against the plaintiff, a letter acquired by the Board subsequent to the hearing (and unbeknownst to plaintiff) from an Army Engineer
to his superior. A New York Mines Bureau expert, said
the letter, had stated that the cave-in danger was contractor's fault. The Board, in fact, quoted the letter -in its
decision, citing its statement that only $9000 was involveda grossly inaccurate figure, which, like the letter, appeared
nowhere in the record. Contractor in the Court of Claims
(1954) alleged the decisions were "capricious or arbitrary
or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith,
or were not supported by substantial evidence", and called
the quoted expert. The expert testified in direct contradiction to the alleged statements, his refutations being corroborated by the government's own witnesses.
The government objected to the de novo evidence. It
argued that on the question of the board decision's freedom
from arbitrariness, its support by substantial evidence, etc.,
the court was restricted to the board's record. The Court
of Claims opinion (1959) was that "on consideration of
all the evidence, the contracting officer's decision cannot
be said to have substantial support," and hence was "not
entitled to finality." 5 As for the government's contention,
the ruling was that Congressional intent in the Wunderluch
Act was otherwise.
The Supreme Court (1963), granting certiorari 6 because
of a conflict between the Court of Claims and certain circuits,7 reversed. It upheld the government's theory that the
term "substantial evidence"
5

144 Ct.C1. 500, 506; 169 F. Supp. 514, 517 (1959).
371 U.S. 939 (1962).
7 The District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court
of Claims over government contract claims under $10,000, 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2). See Allied Paint, etc., Inc. v. U.S., 309 F.
2d 133 (2d Cir. 1962), and Wells and Wells, Inc. v. U.S., 269 F.
6

2d 412 (8th Cir., 1959).
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. . goes to the reasonableness of what the agency did
on the basis of the evidence before it, for the decision
may be supported by substantial evidence even though
it could be refuted by other evidence that was not presented to the decision-making body. (Emphasis in
original).
The ruling, as the court points out, -is well founded in
practical expediency. But it is not one which the court
should attempt to explain, for the next step has the peculiar
flavor of non sequitur about it: There is, therefore, says
the court, "little doubt that the review intended was one
confined to the administrative record."
It is plausible that the Wunderlich Act standard, "goes
to the reasonableness of what was done on... the evidence
before it." But the terms equated are not synonymous: It
does not follow that court review looks only to the board
record, for this logic ignores that very class of cases of
which Bianchi's is a fine example: Here, the board's administrative record is obviously not the same thing as "the
evidence before it." If "the evidence before it" is to be the
thing reviewed, it must include not just the record, but the
ex-parte communication which was in fact before the board,
and on which the finding there was based.
Clearly, to say the one is not to say the other. To quote
again, the subject of review is:
• . .the evidence before it, (emphasis original) for a
decision may be supported by substai'tial evidence even
though it could be refuted by other evidence that was not
presented to the decision-making body. (Emphasis
supplied).
But what we are concerned with in Bianchi's case is
evidence that was presented to the decision-making body.
To say that a determination whether or not there is fraud
or abuse must be limited to the record, is a bit absurd in
cases where that fraud or abuse can lie -in giving a false
appearance to the record. It is even more so when the
decision-maker is himself a party. In short, it means -there
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is no remedy. As Douglas (dissenting) points out, if a
citizen is not going to get relief from fraud or arbitrariness
in the courts, indeed where will he get it?"
The court goes on to cite some practical grounds for
their position. The first, at least, is eminently practical:
The new rule will eliminate the "needless duplication of
evidentiary hearings and a heavy additional burden in time
and expense required to bring litigation to an end," the
Jarndyce-like record of the present case from '46 to '63
being the most obvious example.
Second, the substantial-evidence test will, they say, as
the Legislature -intended, "remedy the practice in many
departments of failing to acquaint the contractor with the
evidence in support of the government's position."
Tortuous logic indeed, if this non-acquaintance is to be
discouraged by a decision so expressly condoning it.
And quoting Congress in favor of limitation to "the
evidence before it"It would not be possible to justify the
finality clause in government contracts
ing procedures were conducted in such
quire each party to present openly its
troversy and afford an opportunity of

retention of the
unless the heara way as to reside of the conrebuttal.9

But obviously the standard adopted in Bianchi will do
nothing of the sort. Its effect indeed will be just the opposite-and the instant case is again exemplary. The irony
in that quotation must have added to the plaintiff's injury
an insult that was excruciating. Obviously the Congressional reasoning quoted was advanced in favor of the
"substantial evidence" requirement as a minimum-that is,
as opposed to no requirement.' 0 The court treats it as justifying a limitation to "substantial evidence" as a maximum, as supporting the finality of substantial evidence.
On the constitutional point, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
147 (1908).
9 H. R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954).
10 See, Hearings before the House Judioiary Committee on H. R. 1839
et al., 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80, section quoted in the instant
case, 83 S.Ct. at 1414.
8
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This faux pas shows all too clearly what the majority
have done: they have gotten dangerously away from the
facts of the case at hand. This ineluctable conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the whole matter of the Engineerexpert letter is noticed only in the dissent. The majority
blithely ignores it. Current talk in Washington has run more
to the impact than to the intrinsic wisdom of the holding.
And this, perhaps, is as it should be, for it is in effect that
the decision is salient. The effect of what judges do lives
after them, and we must live with it. Regardless of the
soundness or unsoundness of the decision's logic, it alters
drastically the status of the, several departmental and
agency appeals boards.1 '
This necessitates a word on the nature of these boards.
When the appeals boards "represent" the busy Secretary
in his claims-reviewing function, they represent his fairest
self-his conscience, just as the chancellors of old were
conscience to the king. Hence, the boards, though of varying
"judiciality" are nearly all composed of lawyers, and in the
more sophisticated boards this "judging" may be that
lawyer's only job. But the fact remains that the board is
the representative of a party.
The court reasons in Bianchi that in normal practice,
after all, an appellate judge looks only at the record, and it
treats the Court of Claims as unqualifiedly appellate. So
by analogizing them to inferior courts, the Court has raised
to the status of a judicial forum, these deciding bodies which
are representatives-albeit the conscientious representatives-of a party to the litigation.
Douglas writes an eloquent dissent, pointing up the
majority's meandering tendencies. He cannot avoid the obstinately patent facts on record. Reminding the majority
that the statutory wording is "unless. . .fraudulent or
capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous . . .or not
11 The party which seems to have drawn the broadest inferences

from the case so far is the Government. See the memorandum
filed by Department of Justice in Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. U.S.,
Ct.C1. #389-59. Stein Bros. provided a surprise for the Government, however. At least so far as the Court of Claims is concerned, it limits the Bianchi exclusion to cases where timely objection is raised by the U.S.
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supported by substantial evidence" (emphasis added), he
declares:
I think the decision was "capricious or arbitrary" because evidence was considered by the Appeals Board in
making its decision which the claimant did not see and
which he had no opportunity to refute.
In addition, it seems to the dissenters that there is something fundamentally wrong when litigation-prevenfive
negotiation is given the dignity of proceedings before an
impartial tribunal. Also, they find Bianchi's implications
disturbing in view of the actual character of these appeals
boards. Douglas quotes Judge Madden's Court of Claims
opinion:
The so-called "administrative record" is in many cases
a mythical entity. There is no statutory provision for...
making them. .. no power to put witnesses under oath...
There may or may not be a transcript...12
One fact emerges clearly here: It is obvious that Madden
and Douglas were thinking of one sort of administrative
hearing, and the majority of another. Neither, of course,
is accurate-and it is this very failure to distinguish which
may be the real fault of the decision: The boards hereby
affected range in "judiciality" from the austerely disassociated ASBCA (Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals), where a transcript is d'obliggio and "ex-parte procedure" is anathema, to boards far more informal than the
one involved in Bianchi. The board members may have no
other administrative function, or they may practice as
government procurement attorneys. Of the diverse boards
coming under Bianchi's mandate three or four have decisions reported fully, formally and regularly (ASBCA,
Interior's, and NASA's do), while others are picked up
sporadically by loose-leaf services, or not at all. Stare decisis
may count for all or nothing. They may come under the

12

Volentine and Litton v. U.S., 136 Ot.Cl. 638, 641-42; 145 F. Supp.
952, 954, followed in Bianchi v. U.S., supra, note 5 (1956).
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Administrative Procedure Act, or may, like the ASBCA and
13
Engineers Board, be specifically excluded.
The point should be clear. Even under the court's new
ruling, the abuses here would probably never happen before
the boards that sit at the Pentagon or Interior-but they
are only too likely to recur in many agencies. In short, it
seems that the boards are far from ready for this blanket
grant of power. Until Congress sees to it that some established measure of uniform judiciality in board proceedings
is guaranteed, we can ill afford to have their status exalted
by such a ruling.
Perhaps not everyone agrees with Douglas thatWhen the agency making the decision relies on evidence
that the claimant has no chance to refute, the hearing
becomes infected with a procedure that lacks the fundamental fairness the citizen expects from his government.
Nevertheless, it seems too clear for argument that what
happened to plaintiff Bianchi here should not happen again
if it can be expediently avoided, for it has the stigmata of
manifest injustice upon -it.
It is upon expediency that the majority has justified its
decision. In view of the chronic plethora of legal paperwork
in Washington, this is a consideration of near-overwhelming
import. Moreover, the claimant himself will be spared the
expense of lengthy court hearings with witness presentation. But contrapose to this the salutary reasoning that "no
man ought to be judge in his own cause", 14 and that if he
is, his findings at least should not be so sacrosanct as not
to be reviewable. Anglo-Saxon though this attitude may be,
it is as well founded in practicality as in traditions.
The merits are hopelessly debatable, but the fact that
for better or worse there has been a substantial increase of
power on the part of the boards is undeniable.
§§ 1004, 1006. See especially thereunder, "A.P.A. § 7,
making mandatory the right of cross examination. Douglas' comment on this express omission: "We are dealing, in other words,
with subnormal administrative procedures."
Bonham's Case, 8 Co., 114a, 118a (1610). It seems that the principle may he considerably older, however. See Mirror of Justices

13 U.S.C.

14

(c. 1287) Selden Society Republications Vol. 7, (London, 1893)
44, 45.

